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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
James Rhoads was convicted, following a jury trial, of felony DUI and felony 
operating a vehicle without the owner's consent (hereinafter, joyriding). Mr. Rhoads 
asserts that the district court erred in allowing a witness to testify to a hearsay statement 
as an "excited utterance." 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On the evening of April 10, 2011, Ada County Dispatch received a 911 call 
reporting that a vehicle had slid off Bogus Basin Road in Ada County around mile post 
7. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) Deputy Shannon Miller 
arrived at the scene and observed two individuals, a man and a woman, who had been 
in a one-car accident. (Trial Tr., p.245, L.1, p.247, Ls.11-24.) The car was badly 
damaged1 and on the edge of a cliff midway up Bogus Basin Road. (Trial Tr., p.246, 
Ls.9-15, p.247, Ls.14-20.) Both Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads were muddy and dressed 
inappropriately for the cold April weather. (Trial Tr., p.245, Ls.21-23, p.247, Ls.10-11, 
p.259, L 13 - p.260, L.1.) Both Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads appeared intoxicated and 
Mr. Rhoads was not wearing shoes. (Trial Tr., p.245, L.23, p.259, Ls.5-15, p.315, Ls.3-
5.) The two individuals told the officers at the accident scene that a man named "Jeff" 
had been driving, but he ran away after he wrecked the car. (Trial Tr., p.246, Ls.1-3, 
p.253, Ls.8-18, p.260, Ls.17-25; PSI, p.2.) The car belonged to Sherry Kreisher, 
1 Damage to the car included barbed wire scratches, mud, and a large crack in the top 
corner of the windshield on the passenger's side. (Trial Tr., p.188, Ls.18-20, p.247, 
Ls.19-24.) 
1 
Ms. Holland's girlfriend at the time. (Trial Tr., p.117, L.25 - p.118, L.3, p.139, L.24 -
p.140, L.1, p.169, L.24-p.170, L.4.) 
Earlier that day, Ms. Kreisher had driven Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads to the 
grocery store and bought a gallon of wine. (Trial Tr., p.121, Ls.6-20, p.142, Ls.18-19.) 
Ms. Kreisher then drove them back to her apartment, where the three proceeded to 
drinkthewinetogether. 2 (Trial Tr., p.121, Ls.21-22, p.141, Ls.11-25.) Ms. Kreisher and 
Ms. Holland laid down on the couch to watch a movie, and Mr. Rhoads left the 
apartment for a period of time. (Trial Tr., p.122, Ls.9-10, p.122, L.20 - p.123, L.5.) A 
short time after Mr. Rhoads returned to the apartment, Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads 
grabbed the bottle of wine and went out the front door, presumably towards the patio. 
(Trial Tr., p.125, Ls.5-8.) It was some time later that Ms. Kreisher realized that her car 
was missing. (Trial Tr., p.125, Ls.17-25.) The keys had been on her purse, in the 
bedroom she had shared with Ms. Holland. (Trial Tr., p.126, Ls.18-23, p.140, Ls.5-7, 
p.194, L.25 - p.195, L.6.) Ms. Kreisher did not see either Ms. Holland or Mr. Rhoads 
take her keys, and did not see anyone driving her car. (Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.3-8.) 
Ms. Holland had previously driven the car with Ms. Kreisher's permission. (Trial 
Tr., p.140, Ls.8-15., p.153, L.24-p.154, L.11, p.197, Ls.1-2.) 
Pictures of the vehicle's interior after the accident reflected that the driver's seat 
was positioned close to the steering wheel. (Defense Ex., C.) The pictures depicted 
the passenger's seat as pushed nearly as far back as it could go.3 (Defense Ex., C.) A 
pair of large shoes was located on the passenger-side floor. (Defense Ex., D.) A pair of 
2 Ms. Holland was only 20 years old at the time, and was arrested that night for illegal 
consumption. (Trial Tr., p.199, L.23 - p.200, L.6, p.320, Ls.17-19.) 
3 Mr. Rhoads is a tall man, approximately six feet tall. (Trial Tr., p.314, L.22 - p.315, 
L.2, 338, Ls.1-2.) Ms. Holland is a petite woman at approximately five feet, five inches, 
130 pounds. (Trial Tr., p.204, Ls.11-14, 337, Ls.24-25.) 
2 
sunglasses identified by Ms. Kreisher as belonging to Mr. Rhoads was located in the 
driver's side door compartment. (Trial Tr., p.135 Ls.11-25.) 
Ms. Holland initially told Deputies Miller and Hale that "Jeff" was driving and she 
was riding in the backseat when the accident happened.4 (Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.8-10, 
p.300, Ls.3-4.) She told the nurse at her physician's appointment three days after the 
accident that she didn't remember anything at all from that day. (Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.11-
19.) In the same visit, she told her physician that the impact was in the front of the 
vehicle and that she was wearing a seatbelt. (Trial Tr., p.287, L.8 - p.288, L.2.) Then 
she testified at Mr. Rhoads' preliminary hearing that she remembered nothing about the 
entire day. (Trial Tr., p.195, Ls.7-22.) Ms. Holland said that she possibly was driving 
when they first left Ms. Kreisher's house, but she didn't remember. (Trial Tr., p.196, 
Ls.17-25, p.197, Ls.10-14.) At Mr. Rhoads' trial, Ms. Holland testified that she 
remembered only bits and pieces of that day. (Trial Tr. p.184, Ls.4-13.) She recalled 
looking for her cigarettes at one point, and at that time Mr. Rhoads was driving. (Trial 
Tr. p.184, L.14 - p.185, L.8.) The next thing she remembered was trying to crawl out of 
the passenger door. 5 (Trial Tr., p.186, Ls.1-4.) 
Mr. Rhoads consistently maintained that "Jeff" was driving the car. (Trial 
Tr., p.253, Ls.16-18, p.260, Ls.22-25, p.312, Ls.9-16.) Ms. Holland's stories varied 
each time she was questioned and/or testified.6 (PSI, p.2; Trial Tr., p.184, Ls.4-13, 
p.195, Ls.7-22, p.196, Ls.17-25, p.197, Ls.10-14, p.253, Ls.8-10, p.300, Ls.3-4.) 
4 Although Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads initially claimed a person named "Jeff" was 
driving and that "Jeff' fled the scene, Ms. Holland later admitted that "Jeff" was a 
fictitious person. (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.7-21.) 
5 The driver's side door was not a valid method of exiting the vehicle, as it was up 
against the barbed wire fence and was hanging over the cliff. (State's Ex. 1.) 
3 
Mr. Rhoads had one previous felony DUI conviction, from a 2006 case. (Trial 
Tr., p.442, Ls.23-25.) Ms. Holland had two prior misdemeanor DUI convictions, one in 
2009 and one in 2011. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. Rhoads was charged by information with felony DUI, felony joyriding, and 
failure to report an accident. (R., pp.40-41.) 
At the jury trial in this case, the State presented the testimony of Deputy Miller 
and Detective Hales of the Ada County Sheriff's Department. (Trial Tr., p.242, L.6 -
p.267, L.19, p.292, L.6 - p.335, L.20) Deputy Miller was the first officer to arrive at the 
scene. She immediately placed the two individuals in the back of her car, as they were 
dressed inappropriately for the weather. (Trial Tr., p.245, Ls.22-23, p.247, Ls.9-11.) 
Deputy Miller then transported the individuals back to the crash site. (Trial Tr., p.246, 
Ls.9-15.) Ms. Holland complained of an injury to her knee. (Trial Tr., p.264, Ls.14-23.) 
Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads sat in the back of Deputy Miller's car for approximately 40 
minutes, during which time they conversed, 7 and even sang. 8 (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.5-23; 
State's Ex., *-008.) Deputy Miller's car video recorded the two's conversations and 
antics. (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.5-23; State's Ex., *-008.) 
Deputy Hales testified that he decided not to have the steering wheel of the car 
tested for finger prints. (Trial Tr., p.331, Ls.6-15.) Although he asked Mr. Rhoads 
whether his fingerprints would be on the steering wheel of the car and Mr. Rhoads 
responded that they might be, on cross-examination, Deputy Hales acknowledged that 
6 For example, Ms. Holland also misrepresented the facts when asked where she lived 
(Trial Tr., p.260, Ls.6-16), when she lost her phone (Trial Tr., p.261, L.21 - p.262, L.3), 
and whether she smoked or drank alcohol (Trial Tr., p.286, L.10 - p.287, L.13). 
7 Some part of their conversation involved reiterating that Jeff was the driver of the car 
and that he had left the scene. (State's Ex., *-008.) 
8 Mr. Rhoads was in a band and presumably they were signing one of the songs his 
band performed. (Trial Tr., p.118, Ls.4-12; State's Ex., *-008.) 
4 
there are several other ways by which Mr. Rhoads' fingerprints could have gotten on the 
steering wheel other than by driving the car. (Trial Tr., p.331, L.16 p.333, L.3.) 
In addition to these officers, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Benjamin 
Cornett, who was an emergency room physician who Ms. Holland's visited three days 
after the accident, purportedly regarding injuries she suffered in the accident.9 (Trial 
Tr., p.280, L.2 - p.281, L.21.) Dr. Cornett testified that Ms. Holland reported that she 
was in a motor vehicle collision and hit her head. (Trial Tr., p.281, Ls.13-19.) 
Dr. Cornett testified that Ms. Holland complained of a dull throbbing frontal headache 
and some nausea, and he determined that she likely had suffered a concussion. (Trial 
Tr., p.281, L.16-p.282, L.15.) 
Finally, the State presented the testimony of a witness who was traveling down 
Bogus Basin Road and saw Mr. Rhoads and Ms. Holland standing on the side of the 
road. (Trial Tr., p.336, L.24 - p.337, L.19.) Over the objections of Mr. Rhoads' 
attorney, the witness was permitted to testify that he heard Ms. Holland say to 
Mr. Rhoads, "You wrecked [inaudible]'s car." (Trial Tr., p.341, L.22 - p.342, L.6.) The 
district court found that this statement was an "excited utterance" and thus fell within an 
9 Dr. Garnett's diagnosis of a concussion was based on information Ms. Holland 
reported to him. (Trial Tr., p.276, Ls.22-24, p.284, Ls.5-17.) A CT scan came back 
negative as did Dr. Garnett's tests of memory, reflexes, etc., so there was no physical 
evidence to support Ms. Holland's complaints other than a moderate tenderness to her 
forehead. (Trial Tr., p.284, L.25 - p.285, L.5.) Further, Ms. Holland told the nurse that 
she did not remember the accident or anything from that day and complained of a 
headache, shoulder pain and low back pain. (Trial Tr. p.285, Ls.11-19.) She told the 
nurse that the vehicle may have just gone off the side of the road. (Trial Tr., p.288, 
Ls.11-16.) However, at the same visit, she told Dr. Cornett many more details about the 
accident-that she was wearing a seat belt, that the driver lost control of the vehicle, 
that the impact was in the front of the vehicle, and that this was a single-vehicle 
accident which resulted in mild damage to the vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.287, L.8 - p.288, 
L.2.) Further, Ms. Holland offered additional inconsistent statements where she told the 
nurse that she did smoke but did not use alcohol, but told Dr. Cornett that she uses 
alcohol, but does not smoke. (Trial Tr., p.286, L.1 O - p.287, L.13.) 
5 
exception to the prohibition against hearsay contained in the rules of evidence, I.R.E. 
803(2). (Trial Tr., p.342, L.18- p.343, L.7.) 
After some discussion of whether Mr. Rhoads would testify, Mr. Rhoads advised 
the district court that he would not be testifying, and the defense rested without 
presenting any evidence. (Trial Tr., p.362, Ls.4-20, p.363, L.18-19.) 
The jury convicted Mr. Rhoads of felony DUI and felony joyriding. (Trial 
Tr., p.441, Ls.13-17; R., pp.158-161.) Mr. Rhoads was acquitted on the charge of 
misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. (Trial Tr., p.441, L.17.) 
At trial, Mr. Rhoads stipulated that this was his second felony DUI in ten years. 
(Trial Tr., p.442, L.23 - p.443, L.6.) 
The district court ordered a PSI, a mental health evaluation, and a substance 
abuse evaluation, and it set the matter for a sentencing hearing. (Trial Tr., p.446, L.24 -
p.27, L.5; 5/8/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.18-25; R., p.153.) 
Mr. Rhoads was sentenced on March 8, 2012. (5/8/12 Tr., generally; R., p.33.) 
At the time of sentencing, Mr. Rhoads was before the court in two cases-the instant 
case as well as a 2006 case in which the State had alleged a probation violation. 
(5/8/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-22.) The 2006 case, CR 2006-124, was a charge of felony DUI, 
to which Mr. Rhoads pied guilty and received a withheld judgment. (5/8/12 Tr., p.5, 
Ls.13-22.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked for a sentence of ten years unified, 
with five years fixed, on the felony DUI and five years indeterminate for the felony 
joyriding conviction. (5/8/12 Tr., p.27, Ls.13-16.) Mr. Rhoads offered significant 
evidence in mitigation (PSI, pp.254-281) and, during his allocution, expressed 
considerable remorse for relapsing and for putting himself in the situation that he did 
6 
(5/8/12 Tr., p.41, Ls.1-5). Mr. Rhoads was sentenced to 10 years, with four years fixed, 
for his conviction of felony DUI. (5/8/12 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-4.) For his conviction of felony 
joyriding, Mr. Rhoads received a sentence of five years, with four years fixed. (5/8/12 
Tr., p.25, Ls.4-8.) Each of these sentences was ordered to run concurrently. (5/8/12 
Tr., p.25, Ls.9-11; R., p.159.) 
Mr. Rhoads timely appealed from his judgments of conviction and sentences. 
(R., pp.164-166, 173-176.) 
7 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting hearsay statements of a co-
defendant/accomplice where the remarks did not fall under the excited utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule? 
8 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Cara Holland's Hearsay 
Statement Through The Testimony Of A Third Party Because The Remark Did Not Fall 
Under The Excited Utterance Exception To The Hearsay Rule 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred in admitting Ms. Holland's alleged statement to 
Mr. Rhoads regarding who wrecked the car, through the testimony of Mr. Guryan, 
because the remarks occurred approximately 20-30 minutes after the accident, when 
Mr. Guryan saw Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads walking up Bogus Basin Road, and the 
car was not immediately in sight. Although the district court found the fact that both 
Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads were covered in mud persuasive to establish the recency 
of the accident, the presence of mud on one's clothing is not synonymous with a 
specific length of time. Further, Ms. Holland and Mr. Roads were found some distance 
from the vehicle and were described as acting calm, indicating both that they had been 
walking up the road for quite some time and they had time to reflect on the accident. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Cara Holland's Hearsay 
Statement Through The Testimony Of A Third Party Because The Remark Did 
Not Fall Under The Excited Utterance Exception To The Hearsay Rule 
During the testimony of Mr. Guryan, the State sought to introduce a statement 
allegedly made by Ms. Holland to Mr. Rhoads as they approached 
Mr. Guryan. Mr. Guryan overheard Ms. Holland say, "I can't believe you wrecked so-
and-so's car." Defense counsel objected (Trial Tr., p.355, Ls.18-20), but the district 
court found that because Ms. Holland and Mr. Rhoads were still covered in mud, the 
statement was "contemporaneous" with the accident (Trial Tr., p.356, Ls.7-13). 
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence (I.R.E.) 802, hearsay is inadmissible except as 
provided by the Rules of Evidence. The relevant hearsay exception is embodied in 
9 
I.R.E. 803(2). Pursuant to I.R.E. 803(2) a "statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition" may come in under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule. I.R.E. 803(2) (emphasis added). In order to fall within this exception, there must 
be a startling event which renders inoperative the normal reflective thought process of 
the observer, and the declarant's statement must be a spontaneous reaction to that 
even rather than the result of reflective thought. State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 4 (1986); 
State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 873, 876 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 325 
(Ct. App. 1999). 
In State v. Griffith, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted: 
In considering whether a statement constitutes an excited utterance, the 
totality of the circumstances must be considered, including the nature of 
the startling condition or event, the amount of time that elapsed between 
the event and the statement, the age and condition of the declarant, the 
presence or absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was 
volunteered or made in response to a question. 
State v. Griffith, 144 Idaho 356, 362-63 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal citation omitted). 
Further, whether to admit a statement as an excited utterance is committed to the trial 
court's discretion, State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 421 (1989); Doe, 140 Idaho at 876, 
and that decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. 
at 877. 
In State v. Burton, 115 Idaho 1154 (Ct. App. 1989), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that the district court did not err in excluding evidence offered by defense counsel 
under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule when there was a five-
minute interval between the end of the declarant/defendant's fight with the victims and 
making the statements. Burton involved an altercation between the defendant, his son, 
and the victims at a bar, and the defendant had shot the two victims with a pistol. Id. at 
10 
1155. The defendant was charged with aggravated battery. Id. When the State called 
the defendant's son as a witness at trial, he attempted to repeat to the jury a remark the 
defendant had made to him as they drove away from the bar. Id. The defendant's son 
attempted to say, '"I had to shoot them. They were going to rat-pack us. . . . I had to 
do it for you."' Id. However, the district court determined that the statement was 
inadmissible hearsay. Id. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Court of Appeals 
noted that the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule "has two 
requirements. First there must be a startling event which renders inoperative the 
normal reflective thought processes of the observer. Second, the declarant's statement 
must be a spontaneous reaction to that event rather than the result of reflective 
thought." Id. at 1156. The appellate court stated that the district court found that the 
second requirement had not been met, noting that: ( 1) the statement was detached by 
time and distance from the events; and (2) the statement was self-
serving. Id. Therefore, the circumstances did not point to any "'special reliability"' that 
would entitle the defendant's statement to be admitted under I.R.E. 803(2). Id. 
In State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323 (Ct. App. 1999), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that the district court committed error in admitting the declarant/victim's remarks 
through the testimony of a police officer, because the remarks were not "excited 
utterances," when there was a ten-minute interval between the end of the declarant's 
fight with the defendant and making the statements. Hansen involved a confrontation 
between the declarant and her boyfriend, and the declarant reported to the police that 
the boyfriend pushed the declarant into her house, smashed furniture, repeatedly 
pushed the declarant onto the couch, and kicked items out of her hands. Id. at 
11 
327. The boyfriend was charged with battery. Id. at 324. The Court noted that in 
determining whether a statement falls within the excited utterance exception: 
[t]he circumstances to be considered include the amount of time that 
elapsed between the startling event and the statement, the nature of the 
condition or event, the age and condition of the declarant, the presence or 
absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was volunteered or 
made in response to a question. 
Id. at 325. In vacating the Judgment of Conviction and remanding the case for a new 
trial, the Court primarily reasoned that (1) the ten minute gap between the conclusion 
of the delcarant's fight with the defendant and her arrival at the police station was 
sufficient time for reflective thought and fabrication; (2) the declarant's anger with the 
defendant could have provided an incentive to concoct or embellish her description of 
the confrontation to the police officer; (3) the statements were not an expletive or burst 
of words in abrupt response to a shocking event, but an extensive narration of the fight; 
and (4) the declarant was not a child, but rather an adult woman. Id. at 326-27. 
Therefore, the statements did not carry the indicia of reliability envisioned by I.R.E. 
· 803(2). Id. at 326. 
Over the objections of Mr. Rhoads' attorney, witness Michael Guryan was 
permitted to testify that he overheard Ms. Holland say to Mr. Rhoads, "I can't believe 
you wrecked [inaudible]'s car." (Trial Tr., p.341, L.22 - p.342, L.6.) Defense counsel 
objected to the statement coming in as an excited utterance because: (1) it was a 
statement by a potential co-defendant; and (2) the statement was not contemporaneous 
to when the incident happened. (Trial Tr., p.355, L.17 - p.356, L.4.) The district court 
found that this statement was an "excited utterance" and thus fell within an exception to 
the hearsay rules. (Trial Tr., p.355, Ls.3-7.) The district court further explained its 
reasoning: 
12 
And the Court will note that one of the things that I paid particular attention 
to is the fact that the parties were still muddy from coming up the hill, and 
that is one of the reasons that I made the determination that this had 
occurred, and the parties were still under the influence of the event. 
(Trial Tr., p.356, Ls.7-13.). 
However, between the time of the accident and the time Mr. Guryan overheard 
Ms. Holland's statement about wrecking the car, Ms. Holland had climbed out of the car, 
perhaps made some attempts to free the car, scrambled up a muddy embankment, and 
began walking/staggering down the road. (Trial Tr., p.262, L.20 p.263, L.10, p.337, 
Ls.15-22, p.346, Ls.16-19, p.348, Ls.3-7.) Thus the statement was detached both by 
time and by distance from the accident. Mr. Guryan, the witness who was traveling 
down Bogus Basin Road and saw Mr. Rhoads and Ms. Holland walking on the side of 
the road, testified that he did not initially see the car: 
In fact, what was odd was that there was no car to be seen when we came 
down the hill and around the corner. We just saw two people. 
(Trial Tr., p.346, Ls.13-19.) Mr. Guryan testified that he couldn't tell if they were arguing 
or struggling to hold each other up, and described it as a "weird dance." (Trial 
Tr., p.339, Ls.9-11, p.348, L.23.) Mr. Guryan said that the two individuals had one shoe 
between them-like they had lost some shoes trying to get up the embankment. (Trial 
Tr., p.348, Ls.3-7.) Further, Mr. Guryan's description of the situation made it clear that 
he was not witnessing some sort of emergency-although the two individuals were 
missing some shoes and were quite muddy, they "popped back up and said, 'Oh, we 
are fine. Everything is good."' (Trial Tr., p.337, L.20 - p.339, L.14.) 
Thus Ms. Holland's statement was sufficiently separated in both time and 
location from the accident such that it was not contemporaneous. 
13 
Further, the statement made by Ms. Holland was self-serving. See Burton, 115 
Idaho at 1156. The district court failed to consider that the statement was made by one 
of only two people in the car who could have been driving. The statement by 
Ms. Holland was most decidedly self-serving. Ms. Holland, a minor under the age of 21, 
was certainly under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident, and, had she 
admitted to driving the car, it was very likely she would have then been charged with 
felony driving under the influence.10 A comment as to who was driving in front of the 
first witness they encountered was a self-serving statement by Ms. Holland, and 
therefore should not fall under the "excited utterance" hearsay exception. 
As Ms. Kreisher's car was found "on an edge of a cliff," held up only by a barbed 
wire fence (Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.14-18, p.252, Ls.9-12), such qualified as a startling event 
which may have, for a period of time during and immediately following the accident, 
rendered inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of those inside the vehicle 
during the accident. However, Ms. Holland's statement was not a spontaneous reaction 
to the accident, but was the result of reflective thought. Here, like the statement in 
Hansen, Ms. Holland had sufficient time after the accident for reflective thought and 
fabrication. Notably, Ms. Holland had, in fact, constructed a story with Mr. Rhoads that 
identified a fictitious person named "Jeff" as the driver of the car. (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.7-
21.) Since Ms. Holland had ample time to reflect and discuss the fabrication of a 
fictitious driver, accordingly she also had sufficient time to reflect on the accident such 
that the statement was clearly not an "excited utterance." The circumstances in this 
10 As Ms. Holland had two prior misdemeanor DUls in the last ten years, she was facing 
felony charges if she was implicated as the driver of the vehicle. (PSI, p.3.) In fact, 
Ms. Holland could have still been charged with a felony DUI as of the date of her 
testimony at Mr. Rhoads' trial. (Trial Tr., p.266, Ls.1-7.) 
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case do not indicate any '"special reliability'" about Ms. Holland's statement such that it 
would be admissible under LR 803(2)< 
Consequently, the district court erred in admitting the statement as an "excited 
utterance," and Mr. Rhoads respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of 
conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Rhoads respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new 
tria I. 
DATED this 1 ih day of April, 2013< 
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/1 / } -
SALL4Y' J. codLEY } 
Deputy State AppellatePublic Defender 
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